The Relationship Between Dreaming and Autonoetic Consciousness

The Neurocognitive Theory of Dreaming Gains in Explanatory Power by Drawing Upon the Multistate Hierarchical Model of Consciousness

Domhoff, G. William

Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz

Many thanks to Matthew L. Dixon for sharing his invaluable expertise and suggesting references concerning the frontal pole and the frontoparietal control network, and to Joseph LeDoux for reading the section on the multistate hierarchical theory of consciousness and for suggesting references on the frontal pole. Further thanks to Matthew Erdelyi for suggesting that graphics of the relevant brain networks might be helpful, and to my frequent coauthor, Adam Schneider, for making the graphics and suggesting many helpful clarifications and word changes in the text.

G. William Domhoff, Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, United States [email protected]

Dreaming 33(1):p 1-18, March 2023. | DOI: 10.1037/drm0000233

The neurocognitive theory of dreaming, which emphasizes portions of the default network as the most important neural substrates that support dreaming, can increase its explanatory power by drawing upon the multistate hierarchical model of consciousness (^;). The default network’s two main subsystems, the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex subsystem and the medial temporal cortex subsystem, are involved in supporting imagination and mind-wandering during waking, which suggests dreaming is a form of spontaneous imaginative thought. The multistate hierarchical model of consciousness considers the regions that support dreaming to be part of the intermediate multimodal areas in the multistate hierarchy. In terms of self-reflective (autonoetic) consciousness, the schemas developed and stored in the intermediate multimodal areas are rerepresented by the higher-order networks in the anterior prefrontal cortex (the dorsal lateral and ventral lateral prefrontal cortices, and the lateral frontal pole), which are the additional regions essential for autonoetic consciousness to emerge. These anterior areas are relatively deactivated during all stages of sleep, which may explain various “cognitive insufficiencies” during dreaming, such as the lack of autonoetic consciousness and episodic memory, and the relative absence of figurative thinking and emotions. Dreaming produces noetic (fact-knowing) consciousness, based on semantic memory. However, there are rare instances of self-awareness during dreaming, in which the anterior higher-order networks are atypically activated during sleep. The findings on the immaturity of the default network until ages 9–11, and the gradual development of the cognitive abilities necessary for dreaming, are consistent with this analysis.